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Abstract
While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge
to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist.
Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders
are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
JEL classification: D78, C71
Keywords: indivisible goods market, dynamics, competitive allocation, strict core,
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1

Introduction

Since Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a market with indivisible goods, called
a housing market, as a game without side payments, several authors have explored the
properties of this market. Shapley and Scarf themselves define the core of this market
in the usual way, as the set of allocation which are not strictly blocked by any other
allocation, and show that it is always non-empty. Moreover, they also show that the set
of competitive allocations is also non-empty and is included in the core of this market.
It is, however, also known that there exist some troublesome properties in the housing market. First, the core may contain an allocation that is weakly Pareto dominated
∗ Corresponding

author.
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by other allocation. Second, the allocations in the core can be “unstable” if we consider
the dynamics of exchange of indivisible goods in the following way. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that an allocation a in the core of the market with initial endowment
w may not be stable once a is realized; a is not guaranteed to be in the core of the
market with initial endowment a. This instability inspired Roth and Postlewaite (1977)
and subsequent works to focus on the strict core. It is known that the strict core satisfies nice properties (Wako, 1984, 1991). However, it is known that the strict core may
be empty. Shapley and Scarf (1974) and Roth and Postlewaite (1977) also consider
competitive allocations, but this competitive “mechanism” is not Pareto-satisfactory.
That is, even if a is a competitive allocation of some market, there may exist another
allocation b in the market such that b weakly Pareto-dominates a. Moreover, in some
market, competitive mechanism may lead to only the Pareto-inefficient allocations.
In this paper, we attempt to resolve these problems by explicitly defining the dynamics of exchanging the indivisible goods among traders and provide an alternative
solution, which we call strict stability (a stronger stability notion than the one proposed
by Roth and Postlewaite, 1977), defined from our dynamics. An allocation is strictly
stable if this allocation belongs to the strict core of the market with this allocation itself being an initial allocation. We show that, unlike the strict core, a strictly stable
allocation always exists.
To illustrate what kinds of dynamic property the set of strictly stable allocations
possesses, we introduce two different dynamics: competitive dynamics and the weak
dominance dynamics. In the competitive dynamics, each of the competitive allocations
of the market is chosen with positive probability, and once chosen, this allocation is
realized and go to next step; in the next step, one of the competitive allocation of this
new market is chosen, and so forth. The weakly dominance dynamics is also similarly
defined. We show that from any initial allocation, in the competitive dynamics, the
dynamic process converges with probability one to some strictly stable allocation. This
implies that the result like the first theorem of welfare economics holds in the dynamics
of Shapley-Scarf housing market, since it is shown that a strictly stable allocation is
Pareto-efficient. The same result holds for the weakly dominance dynamics.
Our dynamic models are critically different from the dynamic recontracting model
introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). Serrano and Volij (2008) consider the dynamic recontracting process in the housing market where in each step, one coalition is
randomly chosen and the members in this selected coalition can propose to recontract
the allocation of their endowment. Serrano and Volij (2008) consider a static exchange
economy, in which recontracting is based on an initial endowment that is fixed throughout the model. They support this assumption by citing the labor market as an example
and claiming that entrepreneurs “do not sell the labour units that they bought in the
previous period.”
In contrast, our dynamic models describe a transition of allocations, reflecting the
situation in which agents do sell what they obtained in the previous period. Our models are similar to Roth and Vande Vate (1990) in this respect. Roth and Vande Vate
(1990) consider a transition of matching pairs in marriage market where in each step,
one of the blocking coalitions is randomly chosen and selected coalition changes the
current matching to the others by the blocking deviation. They show that this dynamics
converges with probability one to a stable matching.
In some situations, it may be natural to consider the case in which only pairwise
trading is allowed . However, we note that the pairwise weakly dominance dynamics,
which is the weakly dominance dynamics admitting only two players deviation, may
stop at a Pareto-inefficient allocation. This limitation of the dynamics is due to the
2
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myopia of the traders. If we incorporate the foresight of the traders in the dynamics,
the dynamics eventually reaches a Pareto-efficient allocation. Here, we introduce a
slightly different notion, a pairwise weakly farsighted stable set, from the dynamics
considered before. The pairwise weakly farsighted stable set is a stable set of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) according to the dominance relations that describes
both pairwise trading and foresight of players. We show that the set of the strictly stable
allocations is a unique pairwise weakly farsighted stable set of the housing market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the market with
indivisible goods is explained. In Section 3, two types of dynamics are considered. In
Section 4, we consider the foresight of traders and incorporate this foresight into the
dynamics. Section 5 is a conclusion.

2

The market with indivisible goods

Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players (traders or owners). A non-empty subset
S of N is called a coalition. There are n indivisible goods, w1 , . . . , wn in the market,
and initially each i owns wi as his endowment. Denote ith player’s preference relation
by %i , where wj %i wk means trader i prefers the goods wj at least as well as wk . The
strict preference relation Âi and the indifference relation ∼i are obtained from %i by
the usual manner.
Let a = (a1 , . . . , an ) be an allocation of the market where ai = wj means trader
i is assigned wj by this allocation. Since each player owns at most one item, ai =
wj implies that there does not exist k 6= i such that ak = wj . By definition, w =
(w1 , . . . , wn ) is an allocation. The set of allocations is denoted by A. Because there
is no externality, for i ∈ N and two allocations a, b ∈ A, we write a %i b if ai %i bi .
The strict preference relation and the indifference relation are also extended over the
set of allocations.
For two allocations a, b ∈ A, we say that a weakly Pareto-dominates b if a %i b
for all i ∈ N and a Âj b for some j ∈ N . An allocation a is said to be Pareto-efficient
if there does not exist b ∈ A such that b weakly Pareto-dominates a.
Fixing the player set and the preference relations, the market depends only on the
initial endowment, and thus we denote the market with initial allocation a by M (a).
Given a market M (a), we say that an allocation c (strongly) blocks1 an allocation
b if there is some coalition S such that
(b.i) {ci : i ∈ S} = {ai : i ∈ S},
(b.ii) c Âi b for all i ∈ S.
The first condition states that the coalition S is effective for the allocation c, and the
second condition states that every member of S strictly prefers c to b.
We define weak blocking by relaxing condition (b.ii) to (b.ii’) c %i b for all i ∈ S
and c Âi b for some i ∈ S.
The core of the market M (a), denoted by C(a), is the set of allocations that are
not blocked by any other allocation in the market M (a). The strict core of the market M (a), denoted by SC(a), is defined by the set of allocations that are not weakly
blocked by any other allocation.
1 In this paper, we distinctly use two phrases, “an allocation b blocks an allocation c” and “an allocation b
dominates an allocation c.” The former implies that given an initial allocation a, the realization of allocation
b can be hampered by some players who alternatively propose allocation c. On the other hand, the latter
means that once an allocation b is realized, this allocation can be replaced by another allocation c.

3
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In the market M (a), an allocation b is competitive if there exists a non-zero vector
of non-negative numbers p = (p1 , . . . , pn ) such that for each i ∈ N , (i) aj Âi bi
implies pj > pi where pj denotes the price of aj and pi denotes the price of ai and
(ii) for j ∈ N with bi = aj , pi = pj holds. The set of competitive allocations of the
market M (a) is denoted by CA(a). It is easily confirmed that if b ∈ CA(a), then
b %i a holds for all i ∈ N . Moreover, if b is a competitive allocation of market M (a),
it is also a competitive allocation of M (b). This is checked as follows. Let p be a
competitive price supporting allocation b in market M (a). Consider a price vector q
such that qi = pj if and only if bi = aj . Then, allocation b is competitive for this q in
market M (b).
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) define an allocation a to be stable if a ∈ C(a) holds.
Likewise, we define an allocation a to be strictly stable if a ∈ SC(a).
We note that the set of strictly stable allocations, which we will denote at the moment by K, coincides with the set of all the Pareto-efficient allocations, which is defined by
AP E = {a ∈ A : there does not exist b such that b weakly Pareto-dominates a}.
Take a ∈ K and assume a ∈
/ AP E . Then, there exists b such that b weakly Paretodominates a. This implies that in the market M (a), b weakly dominates a via coalition
N . This contradicts a ∈ SC(a). Next, take a ∈ AP E and assume a ∈
/ K. Then there
exists coalition S and allocation b such that (i) {ai : i ∈ S} = {bi : i ∈ S}, (ii) ai = bi
for all i ∈ N \ S, and (iii) b %i a for all i ∈ S and b Âj a for some j ∈ S. However,
this implies b weakly Pareto-dominates a — a contradiction.
By this very fact, we can claim that there always exists an allocation that is strictly
stable. Since every strictly stable allocation is in fact stable by definition, this fact
provides a way, different from Roth and Postlewaite (1977) to show the existence of a
stable allocation.
Next, we explain the top trading cycles algorithm introduced by David Gale in
Shapley and Scarf (1974). Let N 0 ⊆ N be a coalition and a be an allocation. A top
trading cycle coalition for N 0 in the market M (a) is a non-empty subset T of N 0 ,
whose members can be indexed in a cycle order,
T = {it+1 = i1 , i2 , . . . , it },
in such a way that each trader ik prefers the good of ik+1 , i.e., aik+1 , at least as good
as any other goods possessed by any trader in N 0 . By the finiteness of N 0 , it is evident
that every coalition N 0 has at least one top trading cycle coalition. Using this idea, we
can obtain a top trading cycles partition of N ,
T1 , T2 , . . . , Tr , where

r
[

Tk = N,

k=1

Sk−1
by taking Tk , 1 5 k 5 m, to be any top trading cycle coalition for N \ h=1 Th . We
can also obtain the correponding allocation b such that for each ik in Th , bik = aik+1 ,
i.e., any ik ∈ Th obtains the goods prescribed by the trading cycle in Th .
Let T T C(a) be the set of allocations that can be obtained as the result of top trading
cycles algorithm for market M (a).
In the literature, the following facts are known:
Fact 1 SC(a) ⊆ CA(a) ⊆ C(a). Moreover, if no agent’s preferences exhibit indifference between two objects, then SC(a) = CA(a) and is a singleton but still
4
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may be a strict subset of C(a). (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Wako, 1984; Roth and
Postlewaite, 1977)
Fact 2 CA(a) is not empty; thus C(a) is also non-empty. (Shapley and Scarf, 1974)
Fact 3 SC(a) may be empty. (Shapley and Scarf, 1974)
Fact 4 b ∈ C(a) does not imply that b is stable. On the other hand, b ∈ SC(a) implies
that b is strictly stable. (The former statement is by Roth and Postlewaite, 1977;
the latter is checked as follows. Assume b ∈ SC(a) for some a is not strictly
stable. This implies that in M (b), there exists c satisfying conditions (b.i) and
(b.ii’). However, this also implies that in M (a), an allocation c can weakly block
allocation b by coalition N — a contradiction.)
Fact 5 For competitive allocation b ∈ CA(a), there may exist another competitive
allocation c ∈ CA(a) such that c weakly Pareto-dominates b. Moreover, for
b ∈ CA(a), there may exist allocation c ∈ A \ CA(a) such that c weakly Paretodominates b. (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977)
Fact 6 Every competitive allocation in CA(a) can be obtained from the “top trading
cycles” algorithm and vice versa. (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) Thus, T T C(a) =
CA(a).
From these facts, we find that there is some difficulty in applying any of these solution concepts to both descriptive and prescriptive analyses of Shapley-Scarf housing
market. If we adopt the core as our solution concept, then we immediately find that
the allocation in the core is not stable in the sense of the dynamics by Fact 4. Fact 4
also suggests that the strict core is a robust concept in the sense of dynamics but Fact 3
says that in some case, the strict core is empty and it does not provide any prediction.
The set of competitive allocations always exits and it is a refinement of the core and is
Pareto efficient if all agents’ preferences are strict (Fact 1 and Fact 2). However, in the
presence of indifference, the competitive “mechanism” may not be Pareto-satisfactory,
in contrast with the case of the exchange economy with divisible goods. That is, even
if a is a competitive allocation of some market, there may exist another allocation b in
the market such that b weakly Pareto-dominates a (Fact 5). This means that the first
theorem of welfare economics does not generally hold in a Shapley-Scarf housing market. In fact, there exists an economy, which is given below, in which every competitive
allocation is not Pareto-efficient.
Example 1. The following example is from Wako (1999). Consider three traders with
the following preferences,
Trader 1 : w2 Â1 w3 Â1 w1
Trader 2 : w1 ∼2 w3 Â2 w2
Trader 3 : w2 Â3 w1 ∼3 w3
Then, it is easily confirmed that in market M (w), there exist two competitive allocations a = (w2 , w1 , w3 ) and b = (w1 , w3 , w2 ). However, a is weakly Paretodominated by allocation (w2 , w3 , w1 ) and b is weakly Pareto-dominated by allocation
(w3 , w1 , w2 ).
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In Sections 3 and 4, we consider these problems by explicitly outlining the dynamic
process. In these sections, we show that a strictly stable allocation have nice properties in the dynamics of exchange of the commodities, thus solving the problems listed
earlier. That is, a strictly stable allocation always exists, is Pareto efficient, and is an allocation that can be reached as a limit point of our dynamic processes. We find that all
of the problems (instability of the core, emptiness of the strict core, and inefficiency of
the competitive allocations) can be resolved when we consider the dynamics and adopt
the strict stability as a solution concept because the dynamics converges with probability one to a strictly stable allocation, the strict core exists in the market with initial
allocation being strictly stable, and the strictly stable allocation is Pareto-efficient.

3

Dynamics and stability

Let Φ be a correspondence that associates with any allocation a a non-empty subset
Φ(a) of A. We define the Φ-dynamics of the indivisible goods market as follows:
——————————————————
Φ-Dynamics
Step 0. Start with any allocation a0 .
Repeatedly apply the following step m from m = 1 ad infinitum.
Step m. Take any allocation a from Φ(am−1 ) with positive probability. Set am = a. We
assume that the probability that any particular allocation a is chosen from Φ(am−1 ) depends only on allocation am−1 .

——————————————————
Given Φ, an infinite sequence {am }∞
m=0 in A is called an outcome of the ΦDynamics if a0 = w and for m = 1, 2, . . . , am ∈ Φ(am−1 ).
We say that an infinite sequence {am }∞
m=0 converges to an allocation a if there
exists some integer M such that for some m = M , a = am , and for all m = M ,
a ∼i am holds for all i ∈ N . Thus, if the sequence converges to a, after some step M ,
only the allocations that are equivalent to a are realized.2
Now we introduce two candidates for Φ. First is the competitive allocations. Let
Φcomp = CA. Then, Φcomp -dynamics is called the competitive dynamics. Note that
by Fact 2, Φcomp (a) 6= ∅ for all a ∈ A.
Next we define the weak dominance dynamics. Given coalition S and two allocaS
tions a and b, we write a −
→ b if {ai : i ∈ S} = {bi : i ∈ S} and ai = bi for all
i ∈ N \ S. We say that an allocation b weakly dominates an allocation a via coalition
S, and we write b .S a, if there exists coalition S such that
S

(d.i) a −
→ b, and
(d.ii) b %i a for all i ∈ S and b Âj a for some j ∈ S.
If there exists some coalition S such that b .S a, we say b weakly dominates a and we
write b . a.
For any allocation a ∈ A, we define D(a) by
D(a) = {b ∈ A : b . a}
2 This

0

does not imply that for any two integers m, m0 ≥ M , Φ(am ) = Φ(am ).

6
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Then, Φwdom is defined by Φwdom (a) = D(a) if D(a) 6= ∅ and Φwdom (a) = {a}
otherwise. The Φwdom -dynamics is called the weakly dominance dynamics.
We say that coalition S and allocation b are a genuine deviant coalition and a genuine deviant allocation for a if (i) b .S a and (ii) S can be represented by {is+1 =
i1 , i2 , . . . , is } such that bik = aik+1 for all k = 1, . . . , s. As the next lemma shows,
whenever allocation a is weakly dominated by other allocation, there exist a genuine
deviant coalition and a genuine deviant allocation for a.
Lemma 1. If b .S a holds, there exist a genuine deviant coalition T and a genuine
deviant allocation c for a.
Proof. We first note without proof that if b .S a, there exists a partition of S, {T1 , T2 ,
. . . , Tm }, such that each Tk can be represented by
Tk = {iktk +1 = ik1 , ik2 , . . . , iktk }
and for each ikh , bikh = aikh+1 . Because b .S a, there must exist i ∈ S such that bi Âi ai .
Let Tk be the subcoalition of S such that i ∈ Tk . Define a new allocation c as follows:
cj = bj if j ∈ Tk and cj = aj otherwise. Then, Tk and c are a genuine deviant
coalition and a genuine deviant allocation for a, respectively.
Two theorems below affirmatively answer the question of whether the competitive
dynamics and the weakly dominance dynamics guarantee the paths that lead to convergent allocations. A consequence is that two dynamics converge to some allocations
with probability one, beginning from an arbitrary initial allocation. Moreover, the convergent allocations must be strictly stable. These results are presented as corollaries to
the two theorems.
Theorem 1. Take any allocation a ∈ A. There exists a finite sequence of allocations
a0 , . . . , ak such that a0 = a, ak is strictly stable, and for each m = 1, . . . , k, am ∈
Φcomp (am−1 ).
Proof. We firstSprovide some notations. For any subset A0 ⊂ A of allocations, define
Φcomp (A0 ) = a∈A0 Φcomp (a). Also, for any allocation a ∈ A, let Ψm (a), m = 1, be
defined as follows:
Ψm (a) = Φcomp (Φcomp (· · · (Φcomp (a)) · · · ))
|
{z
}
m times
m

Thus, Ψ (a) is the set of allocations that are obtained from repeating the operation
Φcomp m times, starting with the initial allocation a. Since c ∈ CA(b) for some
allocation b implies c ∈ CA(c), Ψ1 (a) ⊆ Ψ2 (a) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ψm (a) ⊆ · · · ⊆ A holds.
0
Note that together with the fact that if Ψm (a) = Ψm+1 (a) implies Ψm (a) = Ψm (a)
for all m0 = m, this implies that there exists a convergent set Ψ∞ (a) ⊆ A such that
there exists M such that for all m = M , Ψm (a) = Ψ∞ (a). This M must be less than
or equal to |A|.
Now we show the following claim.
Claim 1: There exists a finite sequence of allocations a0 , . . . , ak such that a0 = a, for
each m = 1, . . . , k, am ∈ Φcomp (am−1 ), and for any c ∈ Ψ∞ (ak ), c ∼i ak for all
i ∈ N.
Consider the set Ψ∞ (a) ⊆ A. Then, since Ψ∞ (a) is a finite set, there must exist
b ∈ Ψ∞ (a) such that b is not weakly Pareto-dominated by any other allocation in
7
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Ψ∞ (a). Then, by the definition of Ψ∞ (a), there exists a finite sequence of allocations
a0 , . . . , ak starting from a0 = a and ending with ak = b such that for each m =
1, . . . , k, am ∈ Φcomp (am−1 ). Since am ∈ CA(am−1 ), allocation am weakly Paretodominates or is equivalent to allocation am , the construction of b implies that for any
c ∈ Ψ∞ (b), c ∼i b for all i ∈ N .
By Claim 1, the proof of the theorem is complete if we show that b, which is
defined in the above paragraph, is strictly stable. Assume, in negation, that b is not
strictly stable. Then, for some c ∈ A and some S ⊆ N , c .S b must hold. Because of
Lemma 1, without loss of generality, let S and c be a genuine deviant coalition and a
genuine deviant allocation for b.
We now show the following claim.
Claim 2: In the market M (b), there exists some competitive allocation d such that for
some i ∈ N , d Âi b.
This claim follows from the observation that because b is not strictly stable, it must
be weakly dominated by another allocation. By proposition 2 of Wako (1991), allocation b must be weakly dominated by some competitive allocation. Label this allocation
as d. Then, by definition of weak domination, there must exist some i ∈ N such that
d Âi b.
The above claim shows that there exists some competitive allocation d in the market
M (b) such that for some i ∈ N , d Âi b holds. However, b is an allocation such that
for any c ∈ Ψ∞ (b) — in particular, for any c ∈ CA(b) — c ∼i b holds for any i ∈ N ,
which yields a contradiction.
Theorem 2. Take any allocation a ∈ A. There exists a finite sequence of allocations
a0 , . . . , ak such that a0 = a, ak is strictly stable, and for each m = 1, . . . , k, am ∈
Φwdom (am−1 ).
Proof. Let {am }∞
m=0 be an outcome of the weakly dominance dynamics. If for some
am , D(am ) is empty, this am must be strictly stable. On the other hand, whenever
D(am ) is not empty, any allocation am+1 ∈ D(am ) weakly Pareto-dominates am .
Because A is finite, this implies that there must exist a finite integer M such that for all
m = M , D(am ) = ∅. Therefore, we have the desired result.
The preceding theorems show that there exists a sequence of allocations that result from either the competitive dynamics or the weak dominance dynamics which
converges to a strictly stable allocation. One question to consider is whether all such
sequences converge to some strictly stable allocation. The answer regarding the competitive dynamics is negative; there can exist a cycle consisting of two different allocations that may be Pareto-indifferent among agents. Instead, if we consider a random
process as is assumed in Roth and Vande Vate (1990), we have the following.
Corollary 1. From any initial allocation a, the competitive dynamics converges to
some strictly stable allocation a∗ with probability one.
Corollary 2. From any initial allocation a, the weakly dominance dynamics converges
to some strictly stable allocation a∗ with probability one.
For the weak dominance dynamics, however, we do have convergence for all such
sequences. We state this fact without proof since it follows from the same argument as
the preceding theorem.
8
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Corollary 3. Every sequence {am }∞
m=0 that is consistent with the weak dominance
dynamics must converge to a strictly stable allocation.
Remark 1. We can show similarly that if we consider a (strong) dominance dynamic
process, every resulting sequence of allocations must converge to a stable allocation.
This argument sheds light on another interpretation of the stability concept defined by
Roth and Postlewaite (1977). They argue that once a stable allocation is reached, there
will be no further trading. Our interpretation is that a stable allocation can be reached
in a finite number of exchanges using the dominance dynamics. Putting these two ideas
together, we have an interpretation of the stability of stable allocations that is similar
to that of the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953).
If an allocation b is a competitive allocation of some market M (a), b ∈ CA(b)
holds by the definition of the competitive allocations, indicating that b ∈ C(b). Thus, in
the competitive dynamics, any allocation appeared in this dynamics is stable. However,
the strict stability holds only for the convergent allocations.
The remaining question in the above discussion is the existence of strictly stable
allocations. An affirmative answer is obtained in the next section. Moreover, it is also
shown that the strictly stable allocation is Pareto-efficient (see the proof of Theorem 3
and the last paragraph of Section 4).

4

Pairwise exchange and foresight

Pairwise exchange of indivisible goods between two traders may be more convincing
in some situation. In order to examine the difference between coalitional exchange
environment and pairwise exchange environment, we consider the pairwise weakly
dominance dynamics. For any allocation a ∈ A, we define Dp (a) by
n
o
S
∃S with |S| = 2 s.t. a−
→b
Dp (a) = b ∈ A :
.
b%i a for all i ∈ S, and bÂj a for some j ∈ S

Then, Φpwdom is defined by Φpwdom (a) = Dp (a) if Dp (a) 6= ∅ and Φpwdom (a) = {a}
otherwise. The Φpwdom -dynamics is called the weakly pairwise dominance dynamics.
The question is whether convergent results like Theorems 1 and 2 hold for pairwise
weakly dominance dynamics. The following example shows the negative answer to this
question. This is quite in contrast with Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Diamantoudi
et al. (2004) that respectively consider the dynamics in the marriage problem and the
roommate problem and show that the convergent results to the stable outcomes holds
in these environments even though they do not consider deviation of more than two
players coalition.
Example 2. Let there be three traders with the following preferences,
Trader 1 : w2 Â1 w1 Â1 w3
Trader 2 : w3 Â2 w2 Â2 w1
Trader 3 : w1 Â3 w3 Â3 w2
The allocation a = (w2 , w3 , w1 ), in which every trader owns his most preferred items,
clearly belongs to the strict core of the initial market M (w) and is also unique competitive allocation of M (w). However, the pairwise weakly dominance dynamics predicts
that the initial Pareto inefficient allocation w = (w1 , w2 , w3 ) prevails because any
pairwise trade between two players inevitably makes one of the two worse off.
9
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Thus, in the weakly pairwise dominance dynamics, the dynamics may stop at
Pareto-inefficient allocation. This is due to the “myopia” of the players presumed in
this dynamics. In the example above, if traders are assumed to have some kinds of
“foresight,” trader 2 may agree to trade with trader 1, despite the fact that this trade
allocations to 2 his worst commodity w1 . The reason for this is that 2 can now trade
with 3, resulting in 3 receiving w1 and 2 receiving w3 .
To demonstrate this point, we consider the dominance relation that captures the
farsightedness of traders.
Motivated by Harsanyi (1974) and Chwe (1994), we define the dominance relation that captures the players’ foresight as follows. We say that an allocation b
pairwise weakly farsightedly dominates or pwf-dominates an allocation a, and we
write b I a, if there exist finite sequences of pairs, S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S q and allocations
a = a0 , a1 , . . . , aq = b such that for each k, 1 5 k 5 q,
(f.i) |S k | = 2,
S

k
(f.ii) ak−1 −−→
ak , and

(f.iii) b %i ak−1 for all i ∈ Sk ,
and
(f.iv) for some i ∈ S1 , b Âi a0 .
The interpretation is that there is a ”leading” deviator that initiates this sequence of
pairwise trading, and this leading deviator is better off in the final allocation. A pairwise
weakly farsightedly stable set (PWFSS) is a subset K of A that satisfies the following
two conditions:
(s.i) For any a, b ∈ K, a I b does not hold,
(s.ii) For any a ∈ A \ K, there exists b ∈ K such that b I a.
Thus, a PWFSS is a stable set for an abstract system (A, I). Conditions (s.i) and
(s.ii) are refereed to as the “internal stability” and the “external stability,” respectively.
A PWFSS presumes the following standard of behaviors of individuals. Suppose
that allocations in set K are commonly considered to be “stable” and allocations outside K to be “unstable” by all the individuals. Then, once an allocation a in K is
reached, any deviation from a never occurs because there exists no stable allocation
that pwf-dominates a, and if in time an outcome b outside K is reached, there exists
stable outcome a ∈ K that pwf-dominates y. Therefore, in a dynamic sense, it is interpreted as follows. From any initial allocation b outside K, there exists a sequence
of allocations starting from b and ending with some allocation a in K such that in each
step, two farsighted traders exchange their goods comparing the their current items
with their final items in allocation a. On the other hand, from any allocation in K, such
a sequence of allocations does not exist.
We show in the following that the set of strictly stable allocations is the unique
stable set with respect to I. Before doing so, we note two properties of I that are used
in the proof of the main result.
Lemma 2. If b I a, then b weakly Pareto dominates a.

10

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper312

10

Kamijo and Kawasaki: Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Hous

Proof. Suppose b I a holds. Then, by definition, there exists a sequence of pairs
S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S q and a = a0 , a1 , · · · , a1 = b such that conditions (f.i) through (f.iii)
and (f.iv) hold. By definition, for some i ∈ S 1 , b Âi a. It now remains to show that for
all other i ∈ N , b %i a. Take any i ∈ N and consider the first step l ≤ q that i appears
in the sequence. By how the sequence is defined we have al−1
= ai . Then, by (f.iii)
i
bi %i al−1
=
a
,
and
thus,
b
%
a.
Therefore,
b
weakly
Pareto
dominates
a.
i
i
i
For the next preliminary result, we need the following notation. If there exists a sequence of allocations and pairs from allocation a to b satisfying condition (f.i), (f.ii)
and (f.iii), we say that there exists a weak pairwise path from a to b and write a ½ b.
Note that by the same logic as the previous lemma, we must have that if a ½ b, then
b %i a for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 3. If b ∈ CA(a), then a ½ b.
Proof. Since an allocation b is obtained as the results of the top trading cycles algorithm
applied for the market M (a), there is the corresponding top trading cycles partition
T1 , . . . , Tm of N . Delete all the singleton coalitions in this partition, and we obtain
R1 , . . . , Rm0 , where for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m0 , there exists h, 1 ≤ h ≤ m, such that
Rk = Th . Let, for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m0 , Rk be represented by
Rk = {ikrk +1 = ik1 , ik2 , . . . , ikrk },
where the indices of the traders represent trading cycle prescribed by the algorithm.
Define a sequence of two-traders coalitions S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S q and a sequence of allocations a = a0 , a1 , . . . , aq = b as follows:
0

q=

m
X

rk ,

k=1

and for h = r1 + · · · + rk−1 + ` and 1 5 ` 5 rk ,
S h = {ik` , ik`+1 },
ah is such that ahik = ah−1
, ahik
ik
`

`+1

`+1

= ah−1
and ahi = ah−1
for all i ∈ N \ S h .
i
ik
`

Then, it is easily shown that these sequences of coalitions and allocations satisfy (f.i)
and (f.ii).
(The above proof is reproduced from the previous version of the paper)
To show that (f.iii) holds, take any h and let S h ≡ {i, j} ⊂ Rk for some k. By how
the trading cycles are defined, it must be the case that for each i ∈ S h , ah−1
is a good
i
traded within Rk . Moreover, since b is a competitive allocation, we can take, without
loss of generality, a price vector p such that
• the prices are the same for each good initially owned by members of the same
(top) trading cycle
• for k 0 ≤ k 00 , pk0 ≥ pk00 where pk0 represents the price of a good traded within
0
trading cycle Rk
Thus, since b assigns i and j a good in Rk , by definition of a competitive allocation,
we must have b %i aih−1 and b %j ah−1
.
j
Further inspection of the proof shows that the order in which these coalitions deviate
is not important for the relation ½ to hold. This observation is important when we use
this lemma to construct a sequence such that the stronger relation I holds.
11
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Theorem 3. The set of strictly stable allocations (denoted by K) is the unique stable
set defined by I.
Proof. Internal stability is established by the first lemma. To show external stability,
take any a ∈ A \ K. Because a is not weakly Pareto optimal, proposition 2 of Wako
(1991) implies that there exists b ∈ CA(a) such that b weakly Pareto dominates a.
Let i ∈ N be any agent such that b Âi a. Construct a ½ b such that S 1 = {i, j}
where j is the agent that satisfies bi = aj . If b happens to be Pareto optimal, then
b ∈ K and b I a, finishing the proof. If not, start from b and construct a sequence
{bk } that converges to an allocation c ∈ K such that for all integers k ≥ 1, bk+1 ∈
CA(bk ). Lemma 3 shows that if am ∈ Φcomp (am−1 ) and am 6= am−1 , am−1 ½ am .
Furthermore, for any integers s, t with t > s, simply connecting weak pairwise paths
as ½ as+1 , as+1 ½ as+2 , . . . , at−1 ½ at , we obtain as ½ at . In this manner, we
can constuct a sequence such that b ½ c. To check that external stability of K holds,
recall that the competitive-dynamics converges to some allocation in K.
By lemma 3, bk ½ bk+1 . Then, we can connect these sequences together to form
a long sequence from a to c that satisfies (f.i), (f.ii), and (f.iv). (f.iii) follows from the
observation that a ½ b implies b %i a for all i ∈ N and from a similar logic used in
the proof of lemma 2.
Uniqueness follows also from lemma 2, since no allocation in K cannot be pairwise
weakly farsightedly dominated by another allocation.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we consider several types of dynamics in Shapley-Scarf exchange economy with indivisible commodities and show that in all of these dynamics except for the
pairwise weakly dominance dynamics, a Pareto-efficient allocation is reached. These
results give useful insight on the market with indivisible commodities and how an efficient allocation can be reached.
First, if the market functions are in such a way that the competitive allocations are
expected to be realized, the Pareto-efficient allocation will be attained after some steps
of reallocation. This result hinges on the assumption that there is enough structure to
the market that allows a competitive allocation to result.
Second, a Pareto-efficient allocation can be realized after reallocations using the
weak dominance dynamics. In the weak dominance dynamics, a group of agents can
convene together and redistribute their endowments at any time. Unlike the competitive dynamics, we do not require as much structure for this dynamic process to work.
However, we still need some structure to allow a group of possibly large number of
agents to cooperate together.
To get around this largeness, our third result shows that if agents are sufficiently
farsighted, the set of strictly stable allocation can be attained by a sequence of bilateral
trades, which are the simplest possible trades in the model. Our results then imply
that even without the ability to be able to have a large group of agents to cooperate,
farsighted bilateral trading can lead to an efficient allocation.
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